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Abstract. For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with
a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks required to
switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is
at most n−1, where n is the number of players. This bound exploits the
geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper
bounds found so far by Ko´czy [7], Yang [13, 14] and a previous result by
ourselves [2] in which the bound was n(n− 1)/2.
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
TU games. We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games
for short). Formally, a TU-game is a pair (N, v) where
– N = {1, . . . , n} is a nonempty finite player set ;
– v : 2N −→ R is a real-valued function such that v(∅) = 0.
A nonempty subset S of N is called a coalition and s stands for its cardinality.
The real number v(S) is interpreted as the worth of coalition S, i.e. the value
generated by players of S when they cooperate without the help of players in
N\S. The set N is called the grand coalition.
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An allocation x ∈ Rn on N is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoff xi ∈ R
to each player i ∈ N . We state: x(S) = ∑i∈S xi.
An allocation x ∈ Rn is efficient if x(N) = v(N), individually rational if
xi ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N and acceptable if x(S) ≥ v(S) for each S ∈ 2N . The
first two properties above can be seen as minimal requirements for an conceivable
allocation. The set of efficient allocations is denoted by E(N, v). An individually
rational and efficient allocation is referred to as an imputation. The (possibly
empty) set of imputations is denoted by I(N, v) ⊆ E(N, v).
The core Let Γ be the class of all finite TU-games. A solution on Γ is a
function F which assigns to each (N, v) ∈ Γ a set of allocations F (N, v). The
most famous solution for TU-games is the core introduced by Gillies [5]. The core
is the solution C on Γ that assigns to each TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ the possibly
empty set C(N, v) of all efficient and acceptable allocations, i.e.
C(N, v) =
{
x ∈ E(N, v) : ∀S ∈ 2N , x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
Note that the core is a subset of the set of imputations. We denote by Γ c the
class of all TU-games with a nonempty core. In the rest of the article we only
consider the class Γ c. The core can be also defined using the notions of block
and dominance.
Given an allocation x ∈ Rn and a coalition S, xS denotes the restriction of
x to S. For two allocations x, y ∈ Rn, we write xS < yS if xi < yi for each i ∈ S
and xS ≤ yS if xi ≤ yi for each i ∈ S but xS 6= yS .
Definition 1. Assume that there exists a non empty coalition S ∈ 2N and two
efficient allocations x and y of E(N, v) such that both y(S) ≤ v(S) and xS ≤ yS
(resp. xS < yS). In such a case, we say that S weakly (resp. strongly) blocks x,
and that y weakly dominates x (resp. y strongly dominates x) via coalition S,
and we denote this relation by x S y (resp. x ≺S y). We write x  y (resp.
x ≺ y) if there exists a coalition S such that x S y (resp. x ≺S y) and say that
y weakly (resp. strongly) dominates x.
The strong dominance relation indicates that it is in the interest of all players
in S to switch from x to y, while the weak dominance relation only imposes that
the payoff of no player in S is reduced when moving from x to y and at least
one of them is strictly better off. In the rest of the article, and with the notable
exception of section 3, we will use the weak dominance relation.
Let x be an efficient allocation that lies out of the core. There necessarily
exists an efficient allocation y such that x(S) < y(S) ≤ v(S). Thus, coalition S
can propose to replace x by y. For instance, y can be any efficient allocation such
that yi = xi + (v(S)− x(S))/s for each i ∈ S, which makes every member of S
strictly better off than in x. Thus, the players of S can threaten to split from
the grand coalition since x ≺S y. In a sense x fails to ensure the stability of the
grand coalition. Such a situation cannot arise if x is a core allocation. Hence, the
core can also be defined as the set of efficient allocation which are not (strongly
of weakly) dominated i.e.
C(N, v) =
{
x ∈ E(N, v) : ∀y ∈ E(N, v),¬(x  y)}.
In other words, the maximal elements of the dominance relations over E(N, v)
coincide with the core allocations. As such, the core satisfies the internal stability
property: elements of the core are not comparable under the weak or strong
dominance relation. Nevertheless, the core is often criticized on two aspects.
Firstly, it does not account for every imputation it excludes. More specifically, the
core does not necessarily satisfies the external stability property: an imputation
out of the core is not always dominated by an imputation of the core. Shapley [11]
has proved the external stability for the class of convex TU-games.4 Secondly,
Harsanyi [6] and Chwe [3] consider that this solution concept is too myopic
because it neglects the effect of successive blocks. Harsanyi [6] introduces a new
indirect dominance relation, which consists of a chain of blocks, in order to cope
with these lacks.
A weak (resp. strong) chain of blocks is a finite sequence (x0, x1, . . . , xm) of
efficient allocations such that, for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1, it holds that xk  xk+1
(resp. xk ≺ xk+1). The number m of allocations in the chain is called its length.
An allocation y indirectly weakly (resp. strongly) dominates an allocation x
if there exists a weak (resp. strong) chain of blocks starting at x and ending
at y. Harsanyi originally applies this indirect dominance relation to study the
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern [12]).
Sengupta and Sengupta [10] employ it to show that the core is indirectly ex-
ternally stable for the weak dominance relation: starting from any imputation
that stands outside the core, there always exists a weak chain of blocks which
terminates in the core. In other words, the core can be considered as a von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set under the indirect weak dominance relation.
1.2 The results
This last result has initiated the literature on the accessibility of the core, on
which the reader is referred to Be´al et al. [2] and the references therein. The
central question that has appeared is to determine a upper bound on the length
of the chain of blocks needed to access the core. Several recent articles try to
answer this question and this article improves on the existing answers. We only
mention the two most recent approaches. In our previous article [2] we show
that the core of any TU-game with n players can be accessed with a weak chain
of blocks of length at most n(n − 1)/2 blocks such that each element of this
chain is an imputation. Yang [14] obtains the linear bound 2n−1 but this result
has two drawbacks. Firstly, this bound only holds for the class of cohesive TU-
games i.e. the class of games in which no partition of the player set generates a
larger cumulated worth than the grand coalition. Secondly, even if the starting
4 A TU-game is convex if for each pair of coalitions S, T ⊆ N , it holds that v(S∪T )−
v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
allocation is an imputation, the other allocations in the weak chain of blocks
need not be efficient, which is rather far from the spirit of the original idea of
Harsanyi [6].
In the present article we also obtain a linear bound: the core can be accessed
in at most n − 1 blocks. More importantly, for the first time in the literature,
we are able to prove that this bound is optimal. These results can be stated as
follows.
Theorem 1. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ c be a n-player TU-game with a nonempty core with
n ≥ 3. For each imputation x ∈ I(N, v), there exists a core element c ∈ C(N, v)
and a weak chain of blocks from x to c with length at most n− 1 and such that
each allocation of the chain is an imputation.
This bound is optimal: for each integer n ≥ 3, there exists a n-player TU-
game (N, v) ∈ Γ c with a nonempty core and an imputation x ∈ I(N, v) such that
each weak chain of blocks from x to any core allocation in C(N, v) has length at
least n− 1.
Note that in the cases n = 1 and n = 2 the set of imputations and the core
coincide, so that the accessibility of the core is trivial. The proof of Theorem 1
relies on a procedure which is similar to the one introduced by Sengupta and
Sengupta [10]. In particular, both procedures share the idea of using a core
element as a reference point. Nevertheless, we introduce four major differences
detailed below.
The first difference is the choice, at each step of the chain of blocks, of the
blocking coalition. While Sengupta and Sengupta [10] choose a coalition among
the most unsatisfied coalitions with respect to the current imputation, we select
a coalition S such that the hyperplane defined by x(S) = v(S) for x ∈ Rn has
a nonempty intersection with the core. As a consequence, the geometry of the
core plays an important role in our analysis.
The second difference is related to the redistribution of the excess of the
chosen coalition S with respect to the current allocation in order to construct
the next allocation in the chain of blocks. In this article, we split equally this
excess among S’s members, which means that all players in S get a strictly larger
payoff. In Sengupta and Sengupta [10] only the members S who get less than
their core target payoff receive a larger payoff. The choice of S and our specific
redistribution of its excess allows for a suitable simplification of the procedure
introduced in Sengupta and Sengupta [10].
The third difference is that the target core allocation can vary from one block
to the next block in the weak chain of blocks while it is unique in Sengupta and
Sengupta [10]. However, all target core allocations that are used along the weak
chain of blocks have at least one common coordinate.
The fourth difference is that the result crucially relies on the use of the Davis-
Maschler reduced-games (Davis and Maschler [4]). The Davis-Maschler reduced-
games describe situations in which all the players agree that the left players get
their core reference payoffs but continue to cooperate with the remaining players,
subject to the foregoing agreement. The Davis-Maschler reduced-games are well
known for being the basis of the so-called reduced-game property, which states
that if an allocation is prescribed by some solution concept in a TU-game, then
the restriction of this allocation to any coalition of players is also prescribed by
the solution concept in the reduced-game associated with these coalition and
allocation. Our previous article describes connections between a game and its
Davis-Maschler reduced-games. In the current article, we explore more deeply
these connections.
In Be´al et al. [2], the first three aspects were not used while the fourth one
was not essential to prove the results.
A parallel study using the strong dominance relation can be investigated. To
the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any such study in the literature
so far. This fact can be explained by our last result: the accessibility of the core
is not guaranteed under the strong dominance relation.
Theorem 2. For each n ≥ 3, there exists a n-player TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ c with
a nonempty core and an imputation x ∈ I(N, v) from which the core cannot be
accessed by a strong chain of blocks.
2 Optimality under the weak dominance relation
In this section, we start by stating some connections between a TU-game and its
Davis-Maschler reduced-games. These intermediary results will be used later on
to prove Theorem 1. Although the proofs are similar than those in Be´al et al. [2],
we give them for completeness. Secondly, we describe the procedure. Thirdly, we
prove the first part of Theorem 1, i.e. that the core of an n-player TU-game is
accessible in at most n− 1 blocks. This part is obtained as a corollary of a more
general result in which we consider efficient allocations instead of imputations.
Fourthly, we show that our bound is optimal.
2.1 Reduced-games equivalences
Let S ⊂ N be any coalition different from N and x ∈ E(N, v) any efficient
allocation. Davis and Maschler [4] introduce the reduced-game with respect to
S and x, denoted by (S, vS,x) and defined as
vS,x(T ) =
0 if T = ∅,v(N)− x(N\S) if T = S,
maxR∈2N\S
(
v(T ∪R)− x(R)) otherwise.
The weak dominance relation  will be used in the Davis-Maschler reduced-
games as well. In such a case, we will specify in which game the dominance
relation is applied in order to avoid any risk of confusion.
A solution F on Γ satisfies the reduced-game property if for each (N, v) ∈ Γ ,
each nonempty coalition S ⊂ N and each x ∈ F (N, v), it holds that xS ∈
F (S, vS,x). It is well-known that the core satisfies the reduced-game property. In
fact, the reduced-game property is one of the axioms used by Peleg [8] in order
to characterize the core.
For the class Γ c of TU-games with a nonempty core, we will construct Davis-
Maschler reduced-games with respect to core allocations only. This section es-
tablishes two interesting properties of such reduced-games.
Let (N, v) ∈ Γ c be any TU-game with a nonempty core, S ⊂ N be any
nonempty coalition and c ∈ C(N, v) be any core allocation of (N, v). Observe
that
vS,c(S) = v(N)− c(N\S) = c(N)− c(N\S) = c(S).
The first lemma establishes connections between the sets of efficient alloca-
tions and the cores of a TU-game and of its Davis-Maschler reduced games.
Lemma 1. Consider any (N, v) ∈ Γ c, any nonempty coalition S ⊂ N and any
c ∈ C(N, v). Pick any allocation x ∈ Rn such that xN\S = cN\S. Then
– x ∈ E(N, v) if and only if xS ∈ E(S, vS,c),
– x ∈ C(N, v) if and only if xS ∈ C(S, vS,c).
Proof. Firstly, suppose that x ∈ E(N, v). It holds that
xS(S) = x(N)−x(N\S) = v(N)−c(N\S) = c(N)−(c(N)−c(S)) = c(S) = vS,c(S),
so that xS ∈ E(S, vS,c). Conversely, suppose that xS ∈ E(S, vS,c). Since xN\S =
cN\S and xS(S) = vS,c(S) = c(S), we get
x(N) = x(S) + x(N\S) = c(S) + c(N\S) = c(N) = v(N),
proving that x ∈ E(N, v).
Secondly, suppose that x ∈ C(N, v). Since x ∈ E(N, v), we have that xS ∈
E(S, vS,c). Now, choose any coalition T ∈ 2S . It holds that:
vS,c(T ) = v(T ∪ T )− c(T ) ≤ x(T ∪ T )− c(T ) = x(T ) = xS(T ),
which means that xS is also an acceptable allocation in (S, vS,c). We conclude
that xS ∈ C(S, vS,c).
Conversely, suppose that xS ∈ C(S, vS,c). Since xS ∈ E(S, vS,c), we have
x ∈ E(N, v). Next, choose any coalition T ∈ 2N . The definition of vS,c and
xS ∈ C(S, vS,c) imply that
v(T ) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (T\S))
= v((T ∩ S) ∪ (T\S))− c(T\S) + c(T\S)
≤ vS,c(T ∩ S) + c(T\S)
≤ xS(T ∩ S) + c(T\S)
= x(T ),
from which we obtain x ∈ C(N, v).
The second lemma describes the connections between the weak dominance
relations in a TU-game and in its Davis-Maschler reduced games.
Lemma 2. Consider any (N, v) ∈ Γ c, any nonemptyset coalition S ⊂ N and
any c ∈ C(N, v). Pick any two allocations x, y ∈ E(N, v) such that xN\S =
yN\S = cN\S and a nonempty coalition T ⊂ S. Then:
x T∪T y in E(N, v) if and only if xS T yS in E(S, vS,c).
Proof. Firstly, assume that x T∪T y in E(N, v). Then x(T ∪ T ) < y(T ∪ T )
and xT∪T ≤ yT∪T . In addition, T ∈ 2N\S implies xT = yT . It follows that
x(T ) < y(T ).
Next, x T∪T y in E(N, v) also means that y(T ∪ T ) ≤ v(T ∪ T ). Therefore,
by definition of y, we get vS,c(T ) = v(T ∪ T )− c(T ) ≥ y(T ∪ T )− c(T ) = y(T ).
We conclude that xS T yS in E(S, vS,c).
Secondly, assume that xS T yS in E(S, vS,c). Then x(T ) < y(T ) and xT ≤
yT . Since xT = yT by assumption, this implies that xT∪T ≤ yT∪T .
Furthermore, xS T yS in E(S, vS,c) also means that y(T ) ≤ vS,c(T ) =
v(T ∪T )− c(T ). Thus, v(T ∪T ) ≥ y(T ) + c(T ) = y(T ∪T ). Therefore x T∪T y
in E(N, v).
One directly obtains the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider any (N, v) ∈ Γ c, any S ⊂ N and any c ∈ C(N, v). Pick
any two allocations x, y ∈ E(N, v) such that xN\S = yN\S = cN\S. If xS  yS
in E(S, vS,c), then x  x in E(N, v).
A key point is that this corollary does not hold if the weak dominance relation
is replaced by the strong dominance relation. This explains the differences in
term of accessibility of the core with respect to the weak and strong dominance
relations. This aspect is formally investigated in section 3.
The intermediaries results in this section also raise a difficulty. Equivalent
results cannot be stated if the considered allocations are imputations: it may
happens that, for an imputation x ∈ I(N, v), the allocation xS is not in I(S, vS,c).
We also discuss this point latter on.
2.2 The procedure
Consider a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ c. From now on, we fix an efficient allocation
x ∈ E(N, v). In order to exploit the results of the previous section, we will
exhibit an allocation which satisfies several properties. It will be used to define
the allocations along our weak chain of blocks. The construction of this allocation
relies on the following result about the geometry of C(N, v).
Lemma 3. Let B(N, v) denote a minimal collection, with respect to set inclu-
sion, of coalitions in 2N\{N} such that
C(N, v) =
{
z ∈ E(N, v) : ∀S ∈ B(N, v), z(S) ≥ v(S)}.
For each S ∈ B(N, v), there exists a core allocation c ∈ C(N, v) such that
c(S) = v(S).
Proof. First note that such a minimal collection B(N, v) trivially exists. By
way of contradiction, assume that there exists T in B(N, v) such that for each
z ∈ C(N, v) it holds that v(T ) < z(T ). Consider the set
D(N, v) = {z ∈ E(N, v) : ∀S ∈ B(N, v)\{T}, z(S) ≥ v(S)}.
Since B(N, v) is a minimal set with respect to inclusion, we have C(N, v) ⊂
D(N, v). Hence, we can choose x ∈ D(N, v)\C(N, v). Pick also any y ∈ C(N, v).
By definition of x and y and by the initial assumption on T , we have x(T ) <
v(T ) < y(T ). Now, define
α =
v(T )− y(T )
x(T )− y(T ) ,
and observe that α ∈ (0, 1). Next, construct the allocation c = αx+ (1−α)y. In
particular, it holds that c(T ) = v(T ). Moreover, c belongs to D(N, v) because it
is a convex combination of two elements of the convex set D(N, v). In addition,
since both x(S) ≥ v(S) and y(S) ≥ v(S) for each S ∈ B(N, v)\{T}, we conclude
that c ∈ C(N, v). This contradicts the initial assumption.
Because the core is a polytope, the statement of Lemma 3 can be strengthen
if the core is full-dimensional, i.e. has a nonempty interior. More precisely, it
is known that for each full-dimensional core, there exists a unique (up to a
multiplication by positive scalars) minimal collection of constraint inequalities
that determines it. Moreover, for each distinct pair of constraint inequalities,
there is an element is the core that saturates the first constraint and lies strictly
above the second constraint inequality. On this point we refer the reader to
Schrijver [9].
Lemma 4. Let x ∈ E(N, v) be an efficient allocation such that x /∈ C(N, v).
There exists an allocation y satisfying the following four properties.
1. y ∈ E(N, v);
2. x  y;
3. there exists c ∈ C(N, v) and i ∈ N such that yi = ci;
4. for each player i ∈ N , we have yi ≥ min(xi, v({i})).
Proof. Consider any x ∈ E(N, v)\C(N, v). By Lemma 3, we can choose a coali-
tion S ∈ B(N, v) such that x(S) < v(S), and therefore a core allocation c ∈






if i ∈ S,
ci if i ∈ N\S.
Now we prove that y satisfies the claimed properties. Actually, we do not use
the particular structure of y for players in S. The important coordinates of y are
on the players in N\S.




+c(N\S) = v(S)+c(N\S) = c(S)+c(N\S) = v(N),
which proves that y ∈ E(N, v).
For the second property, the claim x  y is obviously satisfied since v(S) −
x(S) > 0 and y(S) = v(S) imply x S y.
For the third property, it is enough to show that N\S 6= ∅, which is ensured
by S ∈ B(N, v) since N 6∈ B(N, v).
For the fourth property, the inequality x(S) < v(S) implies that yS > xS .
Finally, for each i ∈ N\S, it holds that yi = ci ≥ v({i}).
The selection of the unsatisfied coalition S such that x S y is the corner
stone of our construction. It is a main difference with Sengupta and Sengupta
[10] and Be´al et al. [2]. We choose S ∈ B(N, v) whereas Sengupta and Sengupta
[10] choose S such that the positive excess v(S) − x(S) is maximal, and Be´al
et al. [2] select a coalition among the smallest coalitions with positive excess.
Selecting S in B(N, v) is necessary to construct an allocation y in a simpler way
than in Sengupta and Sengupta [10] and Be´al et al. [2]. Another difference with
Sengupta and Sengupta [10] and Be´al et al. [2] is related to the use of the core
allocations as a target. Both use a unique core allocation along their weak chain
of blocks. Here, we take in account the whole geometry of the core since it is the
chosen coalition S ∈ B(N, v) that determines which core allocation can be used
to construct the current block.
2.3 The upper bound
We now have the material to prove that the core of any n-player TU-game can
be accessed in at most n− 1 blocks.
Proposition 1. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ c be a n-player TU-game with a nonempty core.
For each efficient allocation x ∈ E(N, v), there exists a core element c ∈ C(N, v)
and a weak chain of blocks from x to c such that
– the length of this weak chain of blocks is at most n− 1;
– each blocking efficient allocation z in this weak chain of blocks satisfies the
condition that, for each j ∈ N , zj ≥ min(xj , v({j})).
Proof. Consider any arbitrary TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ c. The proof is done by in-
duction on the number n of players in (N, v).
Initialization: For n = 1, the unique efficient allocation is also the unique core
allocation so that the result trivially holds.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that the statement of the Proposition 1 holds
for any k-player TU-game, k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Induction step: Consider any n-player TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ c and any x ∈
E(N, v). If x ∈ C(N, v), then we are done. Otherwise, using the procedure de-
scribed in Lemma 4, we construct an imputation y satisfying the four properties
stated in that Lemma.
In particular, there exists a player i ∈ N and a core allocation c ∈ C(N, v)
such that yi = ci. Consider the Davis-Maschler reduced-game (N\{i}, vN\{i},c).
This TU-game is an (n−1)-player TU-game with a nonempty core since Lemma
1 states that cN\{i} ∈ C(N\{i}, vN\{i},c). The induction hypothesis can be used:
there exists a core element d ∈ C(N\{i}, vN\{i},c) and a weak chain of blocks
(z0, z1, . . . , zm) in (N\{i}, vN\{i},c) such that z0 = yN\{i} and zm = d with
m ≤ n− 2. For each k ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, it also holds that zk ∈ E(N\{i}, vN\{i},c).
Furthermore, for each j ∈ N\{i}, we have z0j ≥ min(yj , vN\{i},c({j})) and,
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, zkj ≥ min(zk−1j , vN\{i},c({j})). Hence, for each k ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and each j ∈ N\{i}, it holds that zkj ≥ min(yj , vN\{i},c({j})).
For each k ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, define the allocation z′k ∈ Rn as z′kN\{i} = zk
and z′ki = ci. For each k ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, we have from Lemma 1 that z′k ∈
E(N\{i}, vN\{i},c). Lemma 1 also yields that z′m ∈ C(N, v) since z′mN\{i} =
zm = d and d ∈ C(N\{i}, vN\{i},c). Furthermore, from Lemma 2, the sequence
of allocations (z′0, z′1, . . . , z′m) is a weak chain of blocks in (N, v). This implies
that (x, z′0, z′1, . . . , z′m) is a weak chain of blocks of length m+1 in (N, v). Since
m ≤ n−2, the length of the weak chain of blocks (x, z′0, z′1, . . . , z′m) is bounded
by n− 1, which proves the first part of Proposition 1.
Regarding the second part of Proposition 1, consider any player j ∈ N\{i}.
We have already proved that zkj ≥ min(yj , vN\{i},c({j})). We also have yj ≥
min(xj , v({j})). By definition of vN\{i},c, it holds that vN\{i},c({j})) ≥ v({j}).
Altogether, this implies that
zkj ≥ min(xj , v({j})),
or equivalently, that z′kj ≥ min(xj , v({j})). Lastly, the inequality z′ki = ci ≥
v({i}) ≥ min(xi, v({i})) completes the proof.
The first part of Theorem 1 is a corollary of Proposition 1. In fact, if the set
of efficient allocations is replaced by the set of imputations in the statement of
Proposition 1, then the length of the weak chain of blocks required to access the
core is still at most n − 1. Moreover, for each player j ∈ N , the condition zj ≥
min(xj , v({j})) for each blocking allocation z reduces to zj ≥ v({j}) since xj ≥
v({j}) whenever x is an imputation. This ensures that the weak chain of blocks
only contains imputations. It is nevertheless important to state Proposition 1.
The reason is that, in the induction step, a blocking imputation can be lead to
an efficient allocation which is not individually rational in the associated Davis-
Maschler reduced-game.
2.4 Optimality
This section is devoted to the proof of the second part of Theorem 1, i.e. it is
impossible to improve upon the bound n− 1. More specifically, for each n ≥ 3,
we construct an n-player TU-game with a nonempty core and an imputation
x ∈ I(N, v) such that the length of each chain of blocks from x to any core
allocation of C(N, v) is at least n− 1.
Proof (Theorem 1 — second part). Let n ≥ 3 and (N, v) be the n-player TU-
game such that v(S) = s if s ≥ n − 1 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. If c belongs to
C(N, v), then, for each player i ∈ N , it holds that
ci = c(N)− c(N\{i}) ≤ v(N)− v(N\{i}) = 1.
Combined with the efficiency of c, we obtain that ci = 1 for each i ∈ N . Since
the allocation (1, . . . , 1) belongs to C(N, v), we conclude this allocation is the
unique core allocation.
Now, pick any x ∈ I(N, v)\C(N, v). The imputation x is acceptable for all
coalitions of size at most n − 2 and it is not acceptable for a coalition N\{i}
if and only if xi > 1. Then, the number ∆(x) of coalitions for which x is not
acceptable is the number of players i ∈ N such that xi > 1.
Consider any imputation y ∈ I(N, v) such that x  y. Note that x S y
is only possible if S = N\{i} for some i ∈ N such that xi > 1. Consider any
such block. By definition of a block, we get that y(N\{i}) ≤ v(N\{i}). Now,
consider any other coalition S for which x is not acceptable, which means that
S = N\{j} for some j ∈ N\{i}. Since yj ≥ xj and y, x ∈ E(N, v), it holds that
y(N\{j}) ≤ x(N\{j}) < v(N\{j}).
In other words, if x is not acceptable for a coalition other than N\{i}, then y is
also not acceptable for this coalition. Thus, ∆(y) ≥ ∆(x)−1. It follows that any
weak chain of blocks of length p and starting from x terminates in an allocation
z such that ∆(z) ≥ ∆(x)− p.
Now suppose that the starting imputation x is given x1 = 0 and, for each
i ∈ N\{1}, xi = 1 + 1/(n − 1). It holds that ∆(x) = n − 1. This implies that
each weak chain of blocks of length at most n− 2 and starting at x terminates
in an allocation z, such that ∆(z) ≥ n − 1 − (n − 2) = 1. In other words, each
weak chain of blocks of length at most n− 2 and starting at x cannot access the
core C(N, v). We conclude that a weak chain of blocks of length at most n − 1
is necessary to access the core if x is the initial imputation.
3 An impossibility result under the strong dominance
relation
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 stating that the core is not always accessible
if the blocks are constructed from the strong dominance relation. For each n ≥ 3,
the proof relies on the n-player TU-game depicted in section 2.4, which is used
to show that there exists an imputation from which the core is not accessible
through a strong chain of blocks.
Proof (Theorem 2). For each n ≥ 3, consider the n-player TU-game (N, v) in-
troduced in section 2.4. Consider the set A(N, v) of imputations of (N, v) such
that x ∈ A(N, v) if the following two conditions are satisfied:
– for each i ∈ N\{1}, xi ≥ 1;
– there exists at most one i ∈ N\{1} such that xi = 1.
Note that if x ∈ A(N, v), these two conditions imply that 0 ≤ x1 < 1. The set
A(N, v) is clearly nonempty since it contains the allocation x constructed at the
end of the proof of the second part of Theorem 1 in the section 2.4. Now consider
any imputation x ∈ A(N, v). Pick any i ∈ N and any efficient allocation y ∈
E(N, v) such that x ≺N\{i} y. Recall that no coalition of size at most n− 2 can
block x. Furthermore, observe that i 6= 1 since x(N\{1}) > n − 1 = v(N\{1}).
By definition, for each player j ∈ N\{1, i}, it holds that yj > xj ≥ 1. Moreover,
we have yi = v(N) − y(N\{i}) ≥ v(N) − v(N\{i}) = 1. This proves that y
belongs to A(N, v).
As a consequence, any strong block starting in A(N, v) also ends in A(N, v).
It follows that any strong chain of blocks starting in A(N, v) also terminates in
A(N, v). Since the unique core allocation (1, . . . , 1) does not belong to A(N, v),
we can conclude that the core of the TU-game (N, v) is not accessible from
A(N, v) by means of the strong dominance relation.
It is worth to mention that this result does not contradict Proposition 1, even
if the procedure used in Proposition 1 relies on the strong block constructed in
Lemma 4. The explanation is that a block which is strong in a Davis-Maschler
reduced game is not necessarily strong in the original game.
4 Conclusion
This article proves that the optimal number of blocks required to access the core
of any n-player TU-game is n − 1. Somehow, our result provides a definitive
answer to the question of the accessibility of the core. A challenging issue is
to investigate whether this result still holds for the related concept of coalition
structure core. From Yang [14] and Be´al et al. [1] we know that the number of
blocks required to access the coalition structure core is at most quadratic in the
number of players.
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